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SOME PROBLEMS IN JURISDICTION TO DIVORCE
By JAMES LEWIS PARKS*
T HE American Law Institute in its Restatement of the Conflict
of Laws has codified the rules governing jurisdiction of a
court to grant a divorce, where no personal jurisdiction of the
defendant is obtained, as follows
"A state cannot exercise through its courts jurisdiction to dis-
solve the marriage of spouses of whom one is domiciled witlun
the state and the other is domiciled outside the state, unless the
spouse who is not dormciled in the state (a) has permitted the
other spouse to acquire a separate home, or (b) by his misconduct
has ceased to have the right to object to the acquisition of such
separate home, 7Y1
It is supposed that a divorce granted under the conditions men-
toned is intended to be one that will be entitled to full faith and
credit in every state of the Union under the federal constitution.2
The question, therefore, is exclusively one of federal constitutional
law It will be the purpose of this paper to consider the present
state of the federal authorities and to determine whether the
Restatement accurately embodies within its terms the rules of
these decisions.
So far as the writer knows, there are only three federal
Supreme Court decisions dealing with this important problem.
Atherton v. Atherton,3 Haddock v. Haddock,' and Thompson v.
Thompson.5
In Atherton v. Atherton, the parties had been living together
as husband and wife in Kentucky The defendant, the wife, left
*Dean of the Law School, University of Missouri, Columbia,
Missouri.
"Restatement, Conflict of Laws, sec. 118.2Art. 4, sec. 1.
'3(1900) 181 U. S. 155, 21 Sup. Ct. 544, 45 L. Ed. 794.
4(1906) 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867
5(1913) 226 U. S. 551, 33 Sup. Ct. 129, 57 L. Ed. 347
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the plaintiff domiciled there, going to New York where she pur-
ported to establish a separate and independent domicil. The
plaintiff, after the defendant's departure, instituted a divorce
action in Kentucky, serving the wife constructively only and got
a divorce without the defendant appearing. Later the wife brought
an action for divorce against the husband in New York. The
husband appeared in that action and pleaded the prior Kentucky
decree, but the New York court refused to accredit it upon the
ground that it was not based upon proper jurisdiction over the
wife.' The case was carred to the Supreme Court ot the United
States and the New York decision was reversed, it being held
that the Kentucky decree was valid and should have been
accredited.
While the opinion is not as clear as could be desired, the
actual result of the case seems consistent only with the notion
that a divorce action is a proceeding quasi in rem-an action to dis-
solve a relation or status. Not only did the court in one portion
of its decision characterize the action as being of this nature, ' but
nowhere did they pass upon the question as to whether the wife
was rightfully or wrongfully away from her husband, living in
New York and claiming a domicil there. Now if the action had
been regarded as being in personam, the Kentucky court could
only have had jurisdiction of the wife's person, if she was tinder
6(1898) 155 N. Y. 129, 49 N. E. 933, 40 L. R. A. 291. "The learned
counsel for the defendant argues that the matrimonial
domicil of the wife is that of her husband and consequently we are
compelled to give full faith and credit to the decree tit her
husband's favor. In view of the fact that we have a finding
fixing the wife's domicil in this state, we are of the opinion the
Kentucky decree is void as to her. " 155 N. Y. 129, 133.
"The New York court found that she [i. e. the wife] was justi-
fied by her husband's acts in leaving his home and in acquiring a new
domicil for herself, and that the Kentucky Court therefore obtained
no jurisdiction over her." Peckham, J., dissenting in Atherton v.
Atherton, (1900) 181 U. S. 155, 174, 21 Sup. Ct. 544, 45 L. Ed. 794.7
"Thie purpose and effect of a decree of divorce are to
change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife
and to free them both from the bond." 181 U. S. 155, 162. The
learned court also stated that the rule "as to notice necessary to give
full effect to a decree of divorce is different from that which is required
in suits in personam." (181 U.S. 155, 163) and that a decree of
divorce does not fall "within the rule that a judgment rendered against
one not within the state, or amendable [amenable?] to its jurisdiction.
was not entitled to credit against a defendant in another state; and
that divorces pronounced according to the law of one jurisdiction
ought to be recognized as operative and binding everywhere,
so far as related to the dissolution of the marriage " (181 U.S.
155, 166, quoting from Kent's Commentaries). See, also, Parks, Juris-
diction to Divorce, 35 Law Ser. Univ. of Mo. Bull. 3, 9 et seq.
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-a duty to be with her husband and, as a result of such duty, con-
structively domiciled with. the latter in Kentucky. 8 Of course, if
the wife was so domiciled the Kentucky court did have jurisdiction
of her person,9 but, inasmuch as the federal Supreme Court sus-
tained the Kentucky decree without passing on the wife's innocence
or guilt, it seems necessary to interpret the decision as standing
for the proposition that. a divorce action is one to destroy the
marriage status and can, therefore, be brought at the plaintiff's
domicil without obtaining personal jurisdiction of the defendant
merely upon constructive service upon the latter.10
In Haddock v. Haddock, the parties had been living together
as man and wife in New York. The husband left his wife and
established a domicil in Connecticut. He there obtained a divorce
from his wife-upon constructive service of her and she did not
appear in the action. Later the wife brought an action for divorce
sif a wife is not privileged to live apart from her husband, she is
as a matter of law considered domiciled with him regardless of what
the actual fact may be. See, the Institute's Restatement, Conflict of
Laws, secs. 29 and 30. On the other hand, if a wife is under no duty
to live with her husband, she may acquire a separate domicil and
remove herself from the jurisdiction of her husband's domicil and its
courts. id.
9It has been said that a citizen of a state is, "upon principles of
international right, subject to the laws and the jurisdiction of the
courts of that state," without personal service of process upon him
withm the -boundaries of such sovereign. Henderson v. Staniford,
(1870) 105tMass. 504, 505; Bimeler v. Dawson, (1843) 5 II1. 536, 39
Am. Dec. 430; Sturgis v. Fay, (1861) 16 Ind. 429, 79 Am. Dec. 440.
See, also, Scott, Fuiidamentals of Procedure 41. While the rule, as
stated, is generally conceded, there is a difference of opinion as to
what kind of notice such a judgment must be predicated upon. See
Raher v. Raher, (1911) 150 Ia. 511, 129 N. W 494, 35 L. R. A. (N.S.)
292 and note; Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure 41, et seq., note 25,
"A state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction over an individual
domiciled within the state, although he is not present within the
state?' Sec. 84, Institute's Restatement, Conflict of Laws.
10"Of course if the wife left hier husband because of his cruelty and
without fault on her part as found by the New York court, she was
not guilty of desertion. Yet this court [i. e. the federal'Supreme Court]
held 'that the question of desertion was not open but was conclusively
settled by the Kentucky decree." Holmes, J., dissenting in Haddock
v. Haddock, (1906) 201 U.S. 562, 629, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867.
"Moreover, Atherton v. Atherton decides that the jurisdiction of
the matrimonial domicil, at least, to grant a divorce for the wife's
desertion without personal service does not depend upon the fact of
her desertion, but continues even if the husband's cruelty has driven
her out of the state and she has acquired a separate domicil else-
where " Holmes, J., ibid. The learned judge might well have
added that the divorce would have been valid even though the result
of the wife's acquisition of a new domicil was to effectively remove
herself from the jurisdiction of the Kentucky court. This, of course,
is the clear implication of the quoted excerpt.
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against the husband in New York, where she had remained. The
husband appeared in the wife's action and pleaded the Connecticut
decree, it was not admitted as a defense to the action. Upon
an appeal taken to the federal Supreme Court, the New York
court's judgment was affirmed, the position being taken that the
Connecticut divorce was not binding upon the absent wife. The
matter was disposed of by the court saying, in substance, that the
wife had rightfully remained in New York and, as this was the
case, the Connecticut decree could not be sustained on any theory
The court was of the opinion that if a divorce decree was to be
regarded as one quasi in rem the Connecticut decree could not be
effective because half of the res must have been with the wife
in New York."" On the other hand, if the decree was to be
considered as one in personam, it was thought that it could not be
binding for the reasons that she was neither personally served with
process within the state nor constructively domiciled there.12
The decision in the Atherton Case was explained and
approved in the Haddock Case by saying that in that case
the wife was away from her husband without justifiable
cause. It was stated that this fact gave the wife a constructive
domicil in Kentucky and consequently the courts of that state
jurisdiction of her person."' As already noted, the wife's innocence
or guilt was not considered by the federal Court in the Atherton
Case and, this being so, they could not have regarded the wife as
being personally amenable to the jurisdiction of the Kentucky
court. The decision in the Atherton Case must, to be consistent
""Conceding, however, that he [i. e. the husband] took with him
to Connecticut so much of the marital relation as concerned his
individual status, it cannot in reason be said that he did not leave in
New York so much of the relation as pertained to the status of the
wife. From any point of view, then if the marriage relation
be treated as the res, it follows that it was divisible, and therefore
there was a res in the state of New York and one in the state of
Connecticut. Thus considered, it is clear that the power of the state
did not extend to affecting the thing situated in another state." 201
U. S. 562, 577, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 86712"As New York was the domicil of the wife and the domicil of
matrimony, from which the husband fled in disregard of his duty
the domicil of the wife continued in New York. As
then there can be no question that the wife was not constructively
present in Connecticut and was not there individually domiciled
and did not appear in the divorce cause and was only constructively
served with notice of the pendency of that action, it is apparent that
the Connecticut court did not acquire jurisdiction over the wife "
201 U. S. 562, 572, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 86713(1906) 201 U. S. 562, 571 et seq., 584, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867
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with fundamental principles, have proceeded upon the ground that
a divorce action is not one in personam.
In Thompson v. Tlompson, a decree of separation was
granted to the husband in Virginia, the plice where the parties
had last lived together as man and wife, and where the husband
continued domciled at all tunes. The wife was not personally
served and she had left her husband and settled elsewhere. It
was held that this decree was entitled to full faith and credit. The
court followed the Atlerton Case and again did not inquire into
the question of whether or not the wife was rightfully away
from her husband. In other words, the court must have regarded
the decree as proper even though the wife might not have been
constructively domiciled with her husband and, therefore, person-
ally amenable to the jurisdiction of the Virginia court.1 4 One
would think that this decision would have involved at least a
tacit repudiation of Haddock v. Haddock, because it reqtures the
recognition of a divorce granted by a court, which may not have
jurisdiction of the person of the defendant-wife, and consequently
-according to the Haddock Case-of her half of the res or
marriage relation. But strangely enough the learned court cites
the Haddock Case with apparent approval and distinguishes it
from the Atherton Case. It is said in the Thompson Case that
the reason why the decision in that case and that in the Atherton
Case is correct is because in each instance the action was brought
at the matrimonial domicil of the parties. On the other hand,
the Thompson Case justified and explained the Haddock Case,
holding it to be correct, because there was not at any time "a
matrimonial domicil in the state of Connecticut [i. e. the state
where the divorce was procured] and therefore the res-the mar-
riage status-was not within the sweep of the judicial power of
that state."' 15
4It has sometimes been said that a divorce a mensa et thorodiffers in its nature from an action for absolute divorce, and must be
characterized in every event as an action in personam. See, Pettis v.Pettis, (1917) 91 Conn. 608, 101 Atl. 13, 4 A. L. R. 852 and note.
This possible distinction between the two types of action, however,
was not considered in the Thompson Case, and apparently was not
insisted upon in argument before the Court.
"In the present case, it appears that the parties were married in
the state of Virginia and had a matrimonial domicil there. The
husband had his actual domicil in that state at all times. It is
clear, therefore, under the decision in the Atherton Case and theprinciples upon which it rests, that the state of Virginia had juris-diction over the marriage relation. " 226 U. S. 551, 562, 33
Sup. Ct. 129, 57 L. Ed. 34715(1913) 226 U. S. 557, 562, 33 Sup. Ct. 129, 57 L. Ed. 347.
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The situation is indeed peculiar The Atherton Case seems
to regard a divorce action as an out and out proceeding against a
relation-to dissolve the same. The Haddock Decision explains
the Atherton Case so as to make that decision's conception of a
divorce proceeding as one in personam, and holds itself that a
divorce decree will not be good unless the defendant is construc-
tively domiciled within the state whose court grants the divorce,
or subject personally to that tribunal's jurisdiction. Finally, comes
the Thompson Case, approving the actual decision in the Atherton
Case, and attempting to reconcile the Haddock Case with Atherton
v Atherton by saying that the action there was not brought at
the matrimonial domicil as it was in the Atherton Case. Of cours%
there is this distinguishing fact between the two cases, but this
difference will not reconcile the theories of the two opinions and
make one consistent with the other. The Haddock Case tolerated
and was willing to approve the Atherton Case not because the
husband brought his action at the last matrimonial domicil as such
but, because it said the wife was constructively domiciled there
and, for that reason, the courts at such domicil had jurisdiction of
both the wife and her half of the marriage relation. It seems quite
clear that if the court in the Haddock Case had believed that the
wife had been rightfully away and, consequently not constructively
domiciled at the last matrimonial domicil in the Atherton Case,
they would not have considered the divorce properly granted.
The opinion is ventured that the Haddock Case does not lay down
the rule that the last matrimonial domicil as such has jurisdiction
to divorce upon constructive service, but rather that the decision
holds that such domiciliary court will have jurisdiction when the
defendant wife is still constructively domiciled there, but not
otherwise.
In view of these decisions it is difficult to say just what the
rule of the federal Supreme Court is ultimately going to be. It is
assumed that since the decision in the Thompson Case, that a
divorce granted to a husband at the last matrimonial domicil, con-
structive service of the wife alone being had, will always be
entitled to full faith and credit. Apparently the Thompson Case
did not adopt or notice the incorrect explanation of the Atherton
Case which appeared in the Haddock Case. It seems safe to say
that it is not essential to the validity of such a divorce that the
wife be wrongfully away from her husband. But it is not safe
to assume, merely because the Thampson Case was decided as
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it was, that all that was said by the court in the Haddock Case
can be disregarded, that divorces granted upon constructive service
of the absent spouse under different states of facts than those
existing in the A.therton Case will be sustained, where half of
the res is with the absent spouse and the absent spouse as will
always be the case when half of the res is with him or her, is not
subject personally to the jurisdiction of the court which attempts
to dissolve the marriage, because Haddock v. Haddock was
approved in Thompson v. Thompson and an effort made to explain
it. There is, however, no reason for assuming that this fallacious
explanation of the Haddock Case will be accepted hereafter. It
may be repudiated just as Haddock Case's fallacious explanation
of the Atherton Case was tacitly repudiated'in the Thompson Case.
To the writer it seems evident from what has been written
above that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the results
reached in Atherton v. Atherton and Tiompson v. Thompson on
the one hand and Haddock v. Haddock on the other. In the first
cases mentioned the theory of the decisions, regardless of what
the court may have said, must have been that a divorce action is
one in rem, and a divorce decree will be valid in spite of the fact
that the defendant was served only constructively. On the other
hand, it seems equally obvious that the end reached by the Had-
dock Case is consistent only with the notion that a divorce action
is in effect one in personam. If the fore-goinig analysis of these
three controlling decisions be accurate and until the Supreme
Court has dealt further with this question, how can the law con-
cerning accrediting, foreign divorce decrees be formulated so as to
embody accurately the results of these cases? The word "results"
is used advisedly because obviously no rule can embody incon-
sistent lines of reasoning and be intelligible.
It seems that no divorce can surely be said to be entitled to
full faith and credit under the present authorities when the action
is -brought by the husband unless the decree is entered, either
(1) at-the last matrimonial domicil, or (2) at some other domicil
of the -husband when the wife is wrongfully away and thus
constructively domiciled with the husband. The first assumed
case is dearly within both the Atherton and the Thompson Cases.
In the second case, if the wife is rightfully away, we have a situa-
tion exactly such as we had in Haddock v. Haddock which opinion
so far as can be discovered was not overruled by, but approved
in Thompson v. Thompson. On the other hand, if in the last
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case the wife was not privileged to be living apart from her
husband, she would be constructively domiciled with her husband
and a divorce granted to him upon constructive service upon her
would seem to meet all the requirements prescribed by the
Haddock Case.16
Turning to the cases where the wife brings the action without
the court getting personal jurisdiction of the husband, the action
might be brought either at the last matrimonial domicil, where
the wife might have remained, as if domiciled there, or in some
other jurisdiction where she might have attempted to have es-
tablished a new domicil. In neither of these situations would the
divorce seem to comply with the requirements stated in the opinion
in the Haddock Case. Certain it is that the husband is not amen-
able personally to the jurisdiction of the court, a husband is never
constructively domiciled with his wife and is always privileged to
establish a new domiciliary relationship and allegiance at pleasure.
It would seem to follow from this last proposition perfectly clearly
that whenever the husband is domiciled apart from his wife, his
half of the marriage status must be regarded as being with him
at his new domicil. Accordingly, if the Haddock Case has not
been overruled and controls in all cases other than those that fall
squarely within the facts of the Atherton Case, a divorce granted
to a wife, her husband being domiciled elsewhere, would never
be entitled to full faith and credit, unless the husband was duly
served personally with the process of the divorce court.
It will be remembered, however, that the Supreme Court in
the Tho pson Case, while it apparently approved the decision
in the Haddock Case, interpreted that decision as standing for the
proposition that the Connecticut divorce was invalid because the
action was not brought at the matrimonial domicil, which fact re-
sulted in the court not having the marriage relation within its
jurisdiction." ' Of course, this is an accurate description of the
facts in the Haddock Case but it hardly seems to follow that the
court in the latter case meant to establish a rule to the effect that
the status of the parties will alwoays be within the jurisdiction
16"If the wife did not desert her husband in fact I under-
stand it not to be disputed that a decree of divorce in the case supposed
would be conclusive, and so I understand it to be admitted that if
the court of another state on a retrial of the merits finds them to
have been decided rightly its duty will be to declare the decree a
bar to its inquiry." Holmes. J., dissenting in Haddock v. Haddock,
201 U. S. 562, 628, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867
17(1913) 226 U. S. 551, 562, 33 Sup. Ct. 129, 57 L. Ed. 347
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of the court of the last matrimonial domicil. In the Haddock Case
the matter of finding a matrimonial domicil in Connecticut was
important in the court's eye because if that state was not such a
domicil, then the courts there would not have had jurisdiction of
the wife's person and, in consequence of that fact, her half of
the marriage relation would have also been without the jurisdiction
and would have remained unaffected by any decree that the
Connecticut court might have entered.18 It is believed that so
far as the reasomng of the Haddock Case is concerned that the
only time the question of matrimonial domicil is of any importance
or significance is in determimng whether or not the divorce court
has jurisdiction of a defendant-wife when the action is brought
by the husbavd. If the action is brought in the matrimonial domicil,
then the court has such jurisdiction because the wife, by virtue
.of her duty to be with her husband, is constructively domiciled
there, on the other hand, if she is rightfully away, living else-
where, the court has no jurisdiction of the wife and, according to
the reasomng of the Haddock Case, no jurisdiction of her portion
of the marriage. ,
In spite of the foregoing suggestions, however, some courts
have seized upon the phrase "matrimonial domicil" and the state-
ment quoted above from the Thompson Case and have laid down
the broad proposition that a divorce decree, entered at the last
-matrimomal domicil at the instance of either spouse upon merely
constructive service of the other, will be valid and must be
accredited in all other states.19 Such conclusions seem entirely
2sSee supra, notes .11 and 12.
29"Can it reasonably be contended that the husband may obtain
a dissolution at the matrimonial domicil binding upon all in a case
where the wife deserts him, but the wife may not do so when the
husband abandons the wife? The Supreme Court
clearly points out that thq fiction that the domicil of the husband is
that of the wife does not apply where, as in this case, the husband
has wrongfully abandoned the wife. In such a case the husband
cannot draw to himself by virtue of that fiction, the domicil of the
wife; but the matrimomal-that is, the jurisdictional-domicil remains
with the wife and within .the state of that domtcil." State v. Morse,
(1906) 31 Utah 213, 217, 87 Pac. 705. 7 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1127. If one
could disregard al" that was.said in Haddock v. Haddock, the results
reached by the proposition above quoted would be quite proper.
But as already intimated, Haddock v. Haddock has not been overruled.
and the Supreme Court is free to follow its reasoning in all cases that
are not "on all fours" with the Atherton Case-%. e. in all cases where
the husband is not suing at the last matrimonial domicil. One may
and should concede the proposition advanced in State v. Morse, namely
that where the wife remains at the last matrimonial domicil after
being deserted by her husband, she is not constructively domiciled
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unwarranted and inconsistent with the reasoning in the Haddock
Case.
Does the Restatement reflect accurately the federal decisions
heretofore discussed? The first proposition is that a divorce
granted to a plaintiff-spouse at his or her domicil upon construc-
tive service upon a non-domiciled defendant will be valid, if the
defendant has permitted the plaintiff to acquire a separate home.20
If the action is by the husband at the last matrimonial domicil, the
decree should be regarded as valid under the Atherton Case. So,
also, if the action is by the wife at the matrimonial domicil, if
the dictum in the Thompson Case is adopted, the divorce would
have to be regarded as valid and binding. In all other cases,
with him. But it is not a question of where she may be domiciled, it
is a question of where the husband is domiciled? Now a husband,
regardless of his marital delinquencies, is never constructively domiciled
with his wife. It may be his duty to make a place for his wife at
a newly acquired domicil, but his failure to carry out this duty does
not make him domiciled with his wife, where he left her, perhaps by
the route of desertion. If the husband is not domiciled where the
wife sues, the court where the divorce action is instituted has nojurisdiction over the husband. The Haddock Case states unequivocally
that if a court has no jurisdiction over a defendant, the divorce is
invalid. As already stated, we are not free to assume that Haddock v.
Haddock will not be followed in cases that do not fall within the
actual facts of the Atherton Case.
"The state having jurisdiction of the matrimonial domicil and
one spouse, innocent according to the decisions of the courts of that
state of matrimonial wrong, has jurisdiction of the matrimonial status
and is clothed with power, after reasonable ex ret notice to enterjudgments concerning it, which must be recognized by courts of thejurisdiction of the other spouse." Perkins v. Perkins, (1916) 225 Mass.
82, 87, 113 N. E. 841 (dictum). See, also, Montmorencv v. Mont-
morency, (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) 139 S. W 1168. "As we have said,
to our minds the case of Haddock v. Haddock is based on the fiction
that the matrimonial domicil stays with and follows the innocent party,
whether husband or wife, and that, no matter where the innocent party
may be, the matrimonial domicil is there, and the guilty party is always
constructively present, and, therefore, the court of the state has con-
structively both parties before it." Id. 1172.
In the case last cited, the Texas court granted a wife a divorce
upon constructive service of her husband. Texas was not the last
matrimonial domicil of the parties. The court believed that it could
render a divorce that would be binding in all the states of the Union
because it was thought that the wife, when wrongfully abandoned by
her husband, retained the marriage relation and could take it with
her to a new domicil and subject it to the jurisdiction of the courts of
such new domicil. Professor Beale, Haddock Revisited, 39 Harv.
L. Rev. 417, 426, characterizes the Montmorency Case as "an excel-
lent statement of the meaning of the decision" in Haddock v. Haddock.
The writer ventures the opinion that the meaning attributed to the
case by the learned professor is not justified. The Haddock Case in-
sists upon personal jurisdiction being had of the defendant as already
explained.20Restatement, Conflict of Laws, sec. 118.
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however, it seems that the Restatement's rule goes far beyond and
is nof sustained by the federal cases. As has been already intim-
ated, the whole theory of the Haddock Case was that either the
defendant's person or his or her half of the marriage status must
be within the jurisdiction of the court which grants the divorce.
We cannot say as yet that the Haddock Case, has been nullified
and its rules made inoperative except in the situation that is
covered by-the Atherton Case. This being the case, the question
would seem to be, does the fact that the defendant has permitted
the plaintiff "to acquire a separate home" bring the defendant's
person or his or her half of the marriage relation within the
jurisdiction of the plaintiff's domiciliary court in the absence
of proper personal service of the defendant?
To the writer the answer to this question seems clearly to be
No. It is entirely thinkable that a defendant may agree to live
apart from the plaintiff-spouse and still be rightfully in a home
beyond the jurisdiction of the court where the plaintiff is suing.
In fact, this would seem always to be the case, so far as the
acquisition of domiciliary privileges are concerned, when the de-
fendant is the husband. Nor can the fact that the defendant
has agreed to a separation be regarded as consent on his or her
part -to the submission of the matter of dissolving the marriage
to the jurisdiction of a court where the plaintiff might establish
a separate" home. Any such construction as this seems altogether
unjustifiable.21
The Restatement's second rule is that a domiciled plaintiff
may get a divorce against a non-domiciled defendant, without due
personal service of process, where the defendant by misconduct
has ceased to have the right to object to the plaintiff's acquiring
a separate home.2 2 Under this rule it would seem that either the
husband- or the wife could get a divorce at the last matrimonial
21The Institute's Commentaries on Restatement No. 2 of the Con-
flict of Laws (p. 31) cites Fosdick v. Fosdick, (1885) 15 R. I. 130 to
sustain the proposition that "if the parties have been separated by mu-
tual consent, a divorce at the domicil of either is valid." The husband
appeared in that action and defended, which fact would seem to render
the case of no assistance in the solution of the problem at hand.
The only, federal decision cited in the Commentaries, other than
those herein discussed, is Cheever v. Wilson, (1869) 9 Wall. 108, 19
L. Ed. 604. It is stated that that case holds that "if a wife is deserted
or given other cause for divorce by her husband, she may acquire
a domicil in another state and obtain a valid divorce there." But
in that case also, the defendant appeared, ap-ered and defended.
22Restatement, Conflicts of Laws, sec. 118.
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domicil or any other domicil subsequently acquired upon con-
structive service of process.
Certainly the husband could obtain such a divorce if it was
procured at the matrimonial domicil, so, also, he could at a
newly acquired domicil, within the principles of the Haddock
Case, if it was the duty of the wife to be with him at such new
home.2"
But suppose the action is by the wife, if she sues at the last
matrimonial domicil, the divorce would be binding within the
dictum heretofore referred to in the Thompson Case,"4 but it would
not be if the Haddock Case is to be adhered to. The husband, by
going elsewhere, has removed both his person and his half of the
marriage res beyond the jurisdiction of the court where the wife is
suing. If.the action were brought by the wife at a domicil other
than the last matrimonial domicil, the case is even clearer. Here
a divorce is not even supported by the dictum in the Thompson
Case, and the decree is equally obnoxious to the notions that pre-
vailed in the opinion in the Haddock Case.25
It is wondered whether the second proposition of the Restate-
ment does not, by implication, provide that a divorce granted at
the plaintiff's domiciliary court upon constructive service will be
invalid if the defendant is rightfully away? It would seem that
such an implication would be present. Certainly, if the defendant
is the husband, the implied provision would seem to be correct
unless we are going to follow the dictum in the Thompson Case,
which seems to indicate that a divorce granted at the last matri-
monial domicil to either spouse will always be good.
When the action is brought by the husband it is clear that
the divorce will be good if granted at the last matrimonial domicil
regardless of whether or not the wife is rightfully away, dom-
iciled elsewhere. This is the Atherton Case, which, as already
noted, has been approved by the Thompson Case. Therefore,
in this situation the suggested implied proposition runs counter
to established law On the other hand, if the husband is suing
at a domicil other than the last matrimonial domicil and the wife
is under no duty to be with her husband, the case is the same as
23See, supra, not 16.24See, supra, note 17 and text in connection therewith.25But see, contra, Montmorency v. Montmorency, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1911) 139 S. W 1168; Beale, Haddock Revisited. 39 Harv. L.
Rev. 417
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the Haddock Case and the implied proposition accurately states
the law.
If the foregoing analysis of the federal cases be sound and
accurate, and the purpose of the Restatement is to codify the
federal case law as it is, it would seem that in many respects
the accuracy, of the Restatement can be questioned. On the
other hand, if the purpose of the Restatement is to formulate a
body of rules that will be socially desirable and workable, it is
believed that many persons, qualified to speak, would question the
wisdom of the adopted code. The writer suspects that in some
quarters the proposition would be advanced that a divorce action
should be regarded as wholly within the jurisdiction of the domicil
of either party and that a married woman should not be under
any-legal disability to acquire a separate domicil. A great number
of people would probably prefer the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Holmes in the Haddock Case and would hold to the view
that that dissent, carried to its logical end, would work better
from a social point of view and prevent injustice more than either
the law as it actually is or as it is advocated that it should be
in the Institute's Restatement..2 6
,
26It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the whole problem
of ex parte divorces, but merely to attempt to analyze the Restatement's
codification of the rules embodied in the federal cases. But see, in
addition to Mr. Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion in Haddock v.
Haddock, (1906) 201 U. S. 562, 628 et seq, Ditson v. Ditson, (1856) 4
Z. I. 87; Miller v. Miller, (1925) 200 Ia. 1193, 206 N. W 262, 264.
